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What Is Hazard And Effect Management Process
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What is HEMP and how it is different from Risk Assessment?
Hazard and effect management process(HEMP) is one of the hazard management tools which ensures that hazards are identified, assessed and control measures in place should any accident happens so that the company can quickly go back to business.
The Hazards and Effects Management Process (HEMP) provides a framework for managing HSSE-related hazards.
Risk Assessment in other words is the determination of quantitative and qualitative value of risk related to a situation and recognized threat.
What is a Bowtie?
In the HEMP world, a bowtie is a graphical representation of how a hazard can be released, what the consequences of the release might be, and how the consequences might be prevented [2]. As a risk management tool, the bowtie is one of the most concise ways of depicting the complex relationship between hazards, threats, consequences, control barriers, and recovery measures.
HEMP and ALARP
The risk assessment block at the top of the figure consists of two steps. First, the hazard is identified and the consequence of releasing the hazard is established. Then, the risk (likelihood and severity) of an injury to personnel, and/or damage to assets, environment, or reputation is assessed. It is the magnitude of the perceived risk that dictates the mitigation strategy specified by HEMP. Low risks hazards are managed using a hierarchy of controls within an existing HSE Management System (HSE-MS).
Clearly, the outright elimination of a hazard is the ideal method of risk mitigation. Examples include replacing a toxic material with a more benign substitute, operating under ambient conditions as opposed elevated temperatures or pressures, operating at grade instead of at heights, etc. As obvious as it seems, this risk mitigation pathway is often outside the scope of detailed process safety reviews. By design, these types of safety reviews are focused on thedetails of the design as opposed the rationale for the existence of the hazard in the first place.
Conforming to applicable safety standards is necessary; however, it is not always sufficient to mitigate a specific risk to ALARP. For the chemical process industry, applicable safety standards could come from the government (OSHA, NIOSH, CSB, etc.), industry (API, ASME, ANSI, etc.), or the corporation itself. These standards could be generic (e.g., API 520/521 for overpressure protection), or specific (e.g., NFPA-2: Hydrogen Technologies Code). In general, generic standards are not sufficiently granular to mitigate a specific risk to ALARP.
Conversely, specific standards might only apply to a narrow spectrum of threat-lines. This is the reason why conforming to applicable standards is shown as an “add-on” requirement rather than an independent pathway to ALARP.
Risk reduction to ALARP can be viewed as a process of selecting the right pathway from a menu of increasingly more complex pathways. If the hazard cannot be eliminated, then the next logical question to pose is whether a corporate “best practice” exists to mitigate the specific risk.
One way of capturing a best practice for safeguarding common systems is through the use of a “model bowtie”. In general, these are applicable to common hazards present in common systems. An example might be the mitigation of hydrocarbon overflow from a storage tank located in a tank farm. Deviation from a common practice could render the model bowtie potentially irrelevant. For instance, if the hydrocarbon is highly toxic, or if the storage tank is located inside an operating unit, then the model bowtie described above would not be sufficiently conservative to demonstrate ALARP.
Hazard and effect management process(HEMP) is one of the hazard management tools which ensures that hazards are identified, assessed and control measures in place should any accident happens so that the company can quickly go back to business.
The Hazards and Effects Management Process (HEMP) provides a framework for managing HSSE-related hazards.
Risk Assessment in other words is the determination of quantitative and qualitative value of risk related to a situation and recognized threat.
What is a Bowtie?
In the HEMP world, a bowtie is a graphical representation of how a hazard can be released, what the consequences of the release might be, and how the consequences might be prevented [2]. As a risk management tool, the bowtie is one of the most concise ways of depicting the complex relationship between hazards, threats, consequences, control barriers, and recovery measures.
HEMP and ALARP
The risk assessment block at the top of the figure consists of two steps. First, the hazard is identified and the consequence of releasing the hazard is established. Then, the risk (likelihood and severity) of an injury to personnel, and/or damage to assets, environment, or reputation is assessed. It is the magnitude of the perceived risk that dictates the mitigation strategy specified by HEMP. Low risks hazards are managed using a hierarchy of controls within an existing HSE Management System (HSE-MS).
Clearly, the outright elimination of a hazard is the ideal method of risk mitigation. Examples include replacing a toxic material with a more benign substitute, operating under ambient conditions as opposed elevated temperatures or pressures, operating at grade instead of at heights, etc. As obvious as it seems, this risk mitigation pathway is often outside the scope of detailed process safety reviews. By design, these types of safety reviews are focused on thedetails of the design as opposed the rationale for the existence of the hazard in the first place.
Conforming to applicable safety standards is necessary; however, it is not always sufficient to mitigate a specific risk to ALARP. For the chemical process industry, applicable safety standards could come from the government (OSHA, NIOSH, CSB, etc.), industry (API, ASME, ANSI, etc.), or the corporation itself. These standards could be generic (e.g., API 520/521 for overpressure protection), or specific (e.g., NFPA-2: Hydrogen Technologies Code). In general, generic standards are not sufficiently granular to mitigate a specific risk to ALARP.
Conversely, specific standards might only apply to a narrow spectrum of threat-lines. This is the reason why conforming to applicable standards is shown as an “add-on” requirement rather than an independent pathway to ALARP.
Risk reduction to ALARP can be viewed as a process of selecting the right pathway from a menu of increasingly more complex pathways. If the hazard cannot be eliminated, then the next logical question to pose is whether a corporate “best practice” exists to mitigate the specific risk.
One way of capturing a best practice for safeguarding common systems is through the use of a “model bowtie”. In general, these are applicable to common hazards present in common systems. An example might be the mitigation of hydrocarbon overflow from a storage tank located in a tank farm. Deviation from a common practice could render the model bowtie potentially irrelevant. For instance, if the hydrocarbon is highly toxic, or if the storage tank is located inside an operating unit, then the model bowtie described above would not be sufficiently conservative to demonstrate ALARP.
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References
https://www.linkedin.com/grp/post/2410244-21521648 ... 16487
http://www.allriskengineering.com/library_files/AI ... 1.pdf
http://www.absconsulting.com/thesis/thesis-methodo ... y.cfm
http://www.allacronyms.com/HEMP/Hazard_Effect_Mana ... ocess
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OWVOQ3n8sd0
http://www.allriskengineering.com/library_files/AI ... 1.pdf
http://www.absconsulting.com/thesis/thesis-methodo ... y.cfm
http://www.allacronyms.com/HEMP/Hazard_Effect_Mana ... ocess
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OWVOQ3n8sd0
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